Nick Turse

There were 505 U.S. bases in Iraq, from tiny outposts to mega-establishments, but how many are there in Afghanistan?  400?  450? 550? 1500?!  The situation is confused and confusing, but I attempt to sort it out in my latest TomDispatch article: “Afghanistan’s Base Bonanza.”

Afghanistan may turn out to be one of the great misbegotten ‘stimulus packages’ of the modern era and whatever the eventual outcome of the years-long base-building boom, the results will endure and become part of America’s Afghan legacy.  What that will ultimately mean in terms of blood, treasure, and possibly blowback remains to be seen. 

Read the article here

Images courtesy of DoD

In the wake of several deaths among its contingent of troops in a previously peaceful province in Afghanistan, New Zealand (like France and South Korea) is now expediting the departure of its 140 soldiers. That’s not exactly headline-making news here in the U.S. If you’re an American, you probably didn’t even know that New Zealand was playing a small part in our Afghan War. In fact, you may hardly have known about the part Americans are playing in a war that, over the last decade-plus, has repeatedly been labeled “the forgotten war.”

Still, maybe it’s time to take notice. Maybe the flight of those Kiwis should be thought of as a small omen, even if they are departing as decorously, quietly, and flightlessly as possible.

Imagine for a moment that almost once a week for the last six months somebody somewhere in this country had burst, well-armed, into a movie theater showing a superhero film and fired into the audience. That would get your attention, wouldn’t it? James Holmes times 21? It would dominate the news. We would certainly be consulting experts, trying to make sense of the pattern, groping for explanations. And what if the same thing had also happened almost once every two weeks in 2011? Imagine the shock, imagine the reaction here.

Well, the equivalent has happened in Afghanistan (minus, of course, the superhero movies). It even has a name: green-on-blue violence. In 2012 — and twice last week — Afghan soldiers, policemen, or security guards, largely in units being trained or mentored by the U.S. or its NATO allies, have turned their guns on those mentors, the people who are funding, supporting, and teaching them, and pulled the trigger.

If the Aurora shootings got all the attention here last week, far more Americans are dying at the hands of Afghan allies than died in James Holmes’s hail of gunfire. And yet the message from the more deadly of those rampages is barely in the news and few here are paying attention.

In reality, the American mission in Afghanistan failed years ago. It’s as if we refused to notice, but the Afghans we were training did. Now, they are sending a message that couldn’t be blunter or grimmer from that endlessly war-torn land. Not to listen is, in fact, to condemn more Americans to death-by-ally.

In 2007-2008, there were only four green-on-blue attacks, resulting in four deaths. When they started multiplying in 2010, the initial impulse of coalition spokespeople was to blame them on Taliban infiltrators (and the Taliban did take credit for most of them). Now, U.S. or NATO spokespeople tend to dismiss such violence as individual pique or the result of some personal grievance against coalition forces rather than Taliban affiliation. While reaffirming the coalition mission of training a vast security force for the country, they prefer to present each case as if it were a local oddity with little relation to any of the others — “an isolated incident [that] has its own underlying circumstances and motives.” (Privately, the U.S. military is undoubtedly far more worried.)

In fact, there is a striking pattern at work that should be front-page news here. Green-on-blue attacks have been countrywide, in areas of militant insurgency and not; they continue to escalate, and (as far as we can tell) are almost always committed by actual members of the Afghan military or police who have experienced the American project in their country in a particularly up-close and personal way.

nickturse:

On International Women’s Day, it seems fitting to suggest an article by a woman who has spent most of her life writing about women — most especially the women societies often ignore, those battered in their homes and battered by the wars men make.  At TomDispatch today, writer, photographer, humanitarian worker, journalist and my personal friend Ann Jones brings her years of experience working in Afghanistan to bear in “Green on Blue, Dead Americans, Dead Goats, and Half a Million Gunmen on the Loose.” 
In a powerful and highly-original piece — part history lesson, part analysis of current events — Jones examines just what happens when your Plan A craters and you have no Plan B.  Yes, Jones, reminds us, Washington did have a Plan A in Afghanistan.  The Afghan National Army that America is training at the cost of $12 billion a year was supposed to take over security as the U.S. military drew down.  The recent killings of U.S. military personnel by “allies” in that force remind us that Plan A is a goner, but Washington is sticking to it because they never considered any other options.
Jones reveals just why training up a vast Afghan National Army never made sense.  “In short,” she writes, “Afghan history is a sobering antidote to the relentless optimism of the American military.  Modern Afghan history indicates that no Afghan National Army of any size or set of skills has ever warded off a single foreign enemy or done a lick of good for any Afghan ruler.” 
In addition, she uses the Afghan national game, buzkashi, in which mounted horsemen vie for possession of a dead goat, to explain just why, as the ultimate survivors, Afghans — like the players in that game — look for winners to back and why, as Washington draws down its forces, Afghan troops will look for new “khans” to support.
Jones is one-of-a-kind and so is this article.  Don’t miss it!

nickturse:

On International Women’s Day, it seems fitting to suggest an article by a woman who has spent most of her life writing about women — most especially the women societies often ignore, those battered in their homes and battered by the wars men make.  At TomDispatch today, writer, photographer, humanitarian worker, journalist and my personal friend Ann Jones brings her years of experience working in Afghanistan to bear in “Green on Blue, Dead Americans, Dead Goats, and Half a Million Gunmen on the Loose.” 

In a powerful and highly-original piece — part history lesson, part analysis of current events — Jones examines just what happens when your Plan A craters and you have no Plan B.  Yes, Jones, reminds us, Washington did have a Plan A in Afghanistan.  The Afghan National Army that America is training at the cost of $12 billion a year was supposed to take over security as the U.S. military drew down.  The recent killings of U.S. military personnel by “allies” in that force remind us that Plan A is a goner, but Washington is sticking to it because they never considered any other options.

Jones reveals just why training up a vast Afghan National Army never made sense.  “In short,” she writes, “Afghan history is a sobering antidote to the relentless optimism of the American military.  Modern Afghan history indicates that no Afghan National Army of any size or set of skills has ever warded off a single foreign enemy or done a lick of good for any Afghan ruler.” 

In addition, she uses the Afghan national game, buzkashi, in which mounted horsemen vie for possession of a dead goat, to explain just why, as the ultimate survivors, Afghans — like the players in that game — look for winners to back and why, as Washington draws down its forces, Afghan troops will look for new “khans” to support.

Jones is one-of-a-kind and so is this article.  Don’t miss it!

nickturse:

A photograph of a man holding an AK-47 found in a house in Marja. Taliban propaganda and audio tapes were also found in the residence. United States Marines and Afghan forces continued Operation Moshtarak, meaning “joint operation,” to retake the city of Marja from Taliban forces. The operation is the largest of the war since the invasion, and Marja - long outside the Afghan government’s control - is the Taliban’s last major stronghold in Helmand Province.
© Bryan Denton/Corbis

nickturse:

A photograph of a man holding an AK-47 found in a house in Marja. Taliban propaganda and audio tapes were also found in the residence. United States Marines and Afghan forces continued Operation Moshtarak, meaning “joint operation,” to retake the city of Marja from Taliban forces. The operation is the largest of the war since the invasion, and Marja - long outside the Afghan government’s control - is the Taliban’s last major stronghold in Helmand Province.

© Bryan Denton/Corbis

Despite all the talk of drawdowns and withdrawals, there has been a years-long building boom in Afghanistan that shows little sign of abating. In early 2010, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had nearly 400 bases in Afghanistan. Today, Lieutenant Lauren Rago of ISAF public affairs tells TomDispatch, the number tops 450.
After the grim years of Taliban rule, when the Americans arrived in Kabul in November 2001, liberation was in the air. More than 10 years later, the mood is clearly utterly transformed and, for the first time, there are reports of “Taliban songs” being sung at demonstrations in the streets of the capital.